The new international geo-strategy, return to a multipolar system in which Trump's USA adopts a business approach of modular ad-hoc coalition architecture around specific interests with emphasis on regional burden-sharing, risk management and prioritization - the global chess game, flipped on the board!

Imagine that the global chess game, which we have played by clear rules for decades, has simply flipped on the board. Once, we knew who the king was (USA), who the important pieces were, and what the rules of the "world order" were. Today? The old forces are no longer the only ones deciding, and reality, as we know, is a particularly cruel renovation contractor. Today, we are not only seeing cracks in the wall, but actually feeling a strategic earthquake that is changing the rules of the game. The rapid transition to an era of multipolarity, in which powers like China, Russia, and even regional powers are starting to pull the strings, requires us to update our road maps.

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The recognition of the reality of a multipolar international system (Multipolarity), reflected in statements by figures in the American administration such as President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, requires a renewed examination of the global rules of the game. To understand the changing American geo-strategy, it is essential to analyze the paradigm that preceded it - the one led by President Donald Trump - which was a central accelerating factor in this transition, using theoretical tools from the fields of political economy and game theory. Trump acted to disrupt the existing equilibrium and impose a new equilibrium that is more favorable to the USA. The American recognition of multipolarity indicates a shift from a perception of "liberal hegemony" to a perception of "business realism" of shaping ad-hoc coalitions around specific interests and shifting costs to regional bearers.

The transition from "bipolarity of democracies versus autocracies" to the language of competition management in a decentralized system and American recognition of multipolarity, frees Washington from overload and encourages regional burden-sharing. And it is not just a verbal change, but actually changes the game theory that drives the system: from "unipolar leadership" to modular coalition architecture with emphasis on regional burden-sharing, risk management and prioritization. Because the recognition of multipolarity reflects an understanding that the United States can no longer impose a Pareto Equilibrium (a state in which improving one player's situation does not harm others) on the entire world, but must compromise on a Nash Equilibrium, in which each player responds optimally to the strategies of the others.

🌍The New International Geo-Strategy: Multi-Polarity as American Reality

In an era in which the world is transitioning from a unipolar system, in which the United States ruled unchallenged since the end of the Cold War, to a multipolar world (Multipolar) with multiple centers of power such as China, Russia, India and the European Union - the American recognition of this change marks a turning point. The American administration under President Trump, and in particular Secretary of State Marco Rubio, explicitly recognized this reality. In an interview with Megyn Kelly in January 2025, Rubio said that "unipolarity was a historical anomaly, a product of the end of the Cold War, and now we are returning to a multipolar world" [1]. This recognition is not just rhetoric; it reflects a strategic change in which the United States focuses on narrower national interests, instead of trying to "solve every problem in the world", as Rubio phrased it. The implications of this approach on international geo-strategy are broad, and require an analysis based on political interactions, rational thinking logic and theories from the fields of political economy and political science, relying on game theory.

The rhetorical-conceptual change in Washington, in which Secretary of State Rubio openly described "multipolarity" as the normal state of the system - and the post-Cold War unipolarity as a historical anomaly. In doing so, he signaled a shift in priorities: less "world policeman" and more filtering of interests, bilateral deals, and realistic pricing of power versus cost. The American President Trump says this explicitly in the 2025 National Security Strategy report (NSS: National Security Strategy): "The goal of foreign policy is to defend core national interests; this is the sole focus of this strategy... Balance of power - the United States cannot allow any country to become dominant to the extent that it threatens our interests". And further, it declares "compliance [policy; A.H.] Trump to the Monroe Doctrine in the sphere of influence of the Western Hemisphere" [2], as a sign of seeing regional sphere of influence as a key to security and economy, within a multipolar framework in which the USA prevents hostile control in vital regions. This is not the romance of a "liberal order" - this is America First with balance of power, burden sharing, and minimal coalitions.

This rhetoric is not detached: The 2025 Munich Security Report also states that “the multipolarization process is a fact” - but emphasizes that it is accompanied by political polarization and differentiation of competing models; therefore it recommends institutional "depolarization" to enable effective global governance [3].

Change in Game Theory, from Pareto Equilibrium to Nash

American recognition of multipolarity - as formulated by Rubio and reflected in policy discourse and the 2025 NSS document - is not just a verbal change; it changes the game theory that drives the system: from "unipolar leadership" to modular coalition architecture with emphasis on regional burden-sharing, risk management and prioritization [4].

This strategic change may lead to a more stable world if it leads to cooperation, but also more dangerous if it causes clashes. And as the United States succeeds in adapting itself, without giving up its values [5].

The transition to multi-polarity changes the dynamics of international power relations. Instead of American dominance, we see a system in which countries act as rational players (Rational Choice Theory), seeking to maximize their interests while taking into account the responses of others. For example, game theory provides tools for understanding this behavior: in the Prisoner's Dilemma, countries like the United States and China may choose limited cooperation on issues like trade or climate change, but compete aggressively in regions like Southeast Asia or Africa, for fear of betrayal. The recognition of multipolarity reflects an understanding that the United States can no longer impose a Pareto Equilibrium - a state in which improving one player's situation does not harm others - on the entire world, but must compromise on a Nash Equilibrium, in which each player responds optimally to the strategies of the others.

In the framework of the political economy (Political Economy), this transition emphasizes public choice theory (Public Choice Theory), in which leaders act to maintain internal support. Trump, as president, uses the "rally round the flag" phenomenon to unite the American public around pragmatic foreign policy, such as reducing involvement in foreign troubles and focusing on economic interests. This is while considering audience costs - the political price a leader pays if they back down from commitments. In multipolarity, the United States may reduce such commitments, as Rubio implies, to avoid unnecessary risks. Furthermore, selectorate theory (Selectorate Theory, or Logic of Political Survival) explains why leaders in democratic countries like the United States focus on minimal winning coalitions: Trump emphasizes American interests to maintain voter and elite support, instead of wasting resources on global issues like the tragedy of the commons in environmental or nuclear security matters.

The analysis of political behavior in a multipolar space also relies on theories like diversionary theory, in which leaders use external conflicts to divert attention from internal problems. Trump may lead to a policy where the United States builds temporary coalitions (as described in the coalition-building tools of Shepsle and Laver), but avoids long-term commitments (is the ceasefire in Gaza a test case? see analysis; also in a geostrategic view of Europe, the multipolar approach is applied in practice). In addition, veto players become critical: in a world with multiple centers of power, the number of players who can block decisions increases, making equilibrium in political systems difficult (as described by Shepsle and Weingast). An example is the UN or G20, where China and Russia serve as veto players.

Trump's Geostrategic Approach: The Practice of "America First"

Under President Trump, the American global policy underwent a fundamental change from the liberal-hegemonic approach that characterized the US since World War II, to an approach of transactional bilateralism (Bilateral Transactionalism). Trump viewed alliances and multilateral agreements (such as NATO, the WTO, and the Paris Climate Accord) as an economic and security burden on the US. In his public declaration of "America First", Trump stated that the policy would be based on reciprocity and immediate cost-benefit considerations ("We are building trade relations based on fairness and reciprocity, and defending America's sovereignty without apology").

A practical implementation of the new approach appears in an article published by the Deot Institute (4.10.25) "Peace Deadline, Trump Wants Nobel - The Middle East is Testing Who Will Blink First Before Friday?", which analyzes Trump's ultimatum for a truce and hostage exchanges in Gaza, leaving the actual implementation with many question marks. In practice, it presents classic Agenda-Setting: a time window (72 hours) ← forces decisions; minimum winner: not "world peace" - but a functional deal; burden sharing: UN, Arab states, and Europe as supervisors - institutional depolarization that holds the achievement; telltale signs: reduced fire, incoming logistics, technical messages from Hamas and Israel. All of these align with Trump's declaration in the 2025 NSS document: core interest, balance of powers, ad-hoc coalitions.

This behavior can be analyzed using the following theories:

1. Rational Choice Theory: Trump saw the US's conduct in the world as a failure in maximizing national utility. Every alliance, treaty, or international institution was measured coldly and linearly: Does the agreement improve the US's economic or security situation now, or does it allow "partners" to evade costs (Free-Riding)?
2. Public Choice Theory and Selectorate Theory (Logic of Political Survival): Trump's foreign policy was directed straight at his voter base (the selectorate). The use of protective tariffs, attacks on China, and demands from European allies were seen not only as geostrategic steps but as political tools designed to return jobs, reduce deficits, and strengthen internal public support.

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The expansion is intended for those interested in the in-depth analysis on which the above summary is based and constitutes an academic-scientific expansion of it.

📊 Integrated Geostrategic Analysis, Forward-Looking

Analysis Using Game Theory: Forcing a New Equilibrium

The most important theoretical tool for understanding Trump's strategy is game theory. Trump acted to disrupt the existing equilibrium and impose a new equilibrium that is more favorable to the US:

1. Prisoner's Dilemma and Trust Crisis: Trump argued that the existing alliance system is essentially a prisoner's dilemma that ended badly for the US. Allies "defected" by not paying enough, while the US "cooperated" by providing excessive protection.

• The Strategy: Trump threatened withdrawal and breaking agreements (like withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal) to show he is willing for mutual "defection," thereby forcing his partners to choose renewed cooperation (additional payment, changing agreements) out of fear of the worst outcome (lack of American protection).

2. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto: Trump tried to change the rules to shift the system to another Nash equilibrium. For example, in trade wars with China, he used tariffs to change the existing Pareto equilibrium layout - a state where it is impossible to improve the US's situation without worsening China's.

• One can imagine a payoff matrix where the US prefers "imposing tariffs" (defection) over "free trade" (cooperation) as long as China is involved in "unfair practices".

3. Audience Costs and Rally Round the Flag: Trump exploited his position as a single and dominant Veto Player. Through frequent use of the X network and sharp public speeches, he created very high audience costs for himself. When he declared "We will withdraw from NATO if you don't pay", he created a public commitment that made it hard for him to back down. This served as a signaling mechanism to external players about his uncompromising determination.

Alongside the theories, algorithms and metrics can improve the analysis. For example, a network analysis algorithm (Network Analysis) can map alliance networks in multipolarity, using the centrality measure to identify dominant centers of power like the United States or China. A political risk assessment algorithm will evaluate American risks in this reality, while a Monte Carlo simulation will simulate dynamic conflict scenarios. Power metrics like the Shapley Value and Banzhaf Power Index will measure the US's influence in international coalitions, while the Gini index will examine inequality in global power.

The analysis of the new geostrategy must integrate Trump's transactionalism principles with the current recognition of multipolarity. To this end, it is recommended to use the following theories, algorithms, and metrics:

Implications for Israel and the Middle East

In the multipolar world, Israel must adapt its geostrategy. The American shift to "business realism" means Israel can no longer rely solely on US support but must build regional coalitions (e.g., Abraham Accords) and share burdens. For example, in the Gaza conflict, Trump's approach emphasizes quick deals and cost-sharing, as seen in his ultimatum for a ceasefire.

Israel should use game theory to navigate this: Treat regional players (Saudi Arabia, Iran) as rational actors in a repeated game, building trust through iterated cooperation (Tit-for-Tat strategy). Politically, Israel can apply public choice theory to strengthen internal coalitions while managing audience costs in international commitments.

Conclusion: Multipolarity as Opportunity

The recognition of multipolarity is not a retreat but a strategic pivot. By adopting modular coalitions and burden-sharing, the US can manage risks better. For other nations, this opens opportunities for independent action but also increases instability. Success depends on balancing competition with cooperation, using tools from game theory and political economy to forge a stable new order.

References

1. What Rubio said about multipolarity should get more attention | Responsible Statecraft
2. 2025-National-Security-Strategy
3. Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization - Munich Security Conference
4. The Trump Administration’s Belief in Multipolarity Informs Its Transatlantic Security Policy | Hudson Institute
5. Making Multipolarity Work: How America Should Navigate a New Global Order